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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
3 
We are asked to determine whether this case is a class 
action that belongs in federal court under the Class Action 
Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 
(“CAFA”).  Erie Insurance Exchange (“Exchange”) filed suit 
against its attorney-in-fact, Erie Indemnity Co. (“Indemnity”), 
in Pennsylvania state court, alleging that Indemnity 
misappropriated over $300 million in fees that belonged to 
Exchange.  The complaint was filed for Exchange “by” 
certain of its members as trustees ad litem, and by those 
members “on behalf of” all other members.  Contending that 
the words “on behalf of” convert this case into a class action, 
Indemnity removed the case to federal court but the District 
Court remanded the case to state court on Exchange‟s motion.  
Because this case was brought under state rules that bear no 
resemblance to Rule 23 in that they allow for suits by entities, 
not a conglomerate of individuals, we conclude that it does 
not meet the statutory definition of “class action.”  We 
therefore affirm the District Court‟s order. 
 
I. 
 
A. Factual Background 
 
The parties do not dispute that Exchange is a 
reciprocal insurance exchange organized under Pennsylvania 
law.  Since at least 1921, Pennsylvania has authorized the 
aggregation of resources for the purpose of covering most 
losses that may otherwise be insured against under 
Pennsylvania‟s laws.  See 40 PA. STAT. ANN. § 961 (2012).  
Thus, Exchange‟s members purchase insurance policies and 
receive indemnification for losses out of Exchange‟s pool of 
funds.  The pool is comprised of fees, including insurance 
premiums and other charges, paid by Exchange‟s members.  
4 
Importantly, the legal association of these individuals exists 
independent of this suit. 
 
The original complaint, filed in the Court of Common 
Pleas of Fayette County, Pennsylvania on August 1, 2012 (the 
“Complaint”), alleges that Exchange is owned by its 
subscribers and has no independent officers or governing 
body.  It also alleges that Indemnity is a public corporation 
organized under Pennsylvania law, and that it serves as 
attorney-in-fact for Exchange.  According to the Complaint, 
to receive insurance, each Exchange member is required to 
sign an identical agreement appointing Indemnity as attorney-
in-fact on behalf of Exchange (the “Subscriber‟s 
Agreement”).  The Subscriber‟s Agreement gives Indemnity 
broad powers to “manage and conduct the business and 
affairs of” Exchange, including the ability to issue policies for 
Exchange, collect premiums, and invest Exchange‟s funds.  
Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 35.  In exchange for these services, 
Indemnity is permitted to retain up to 25% of all premiums 
written or assumed by Exchange.  The balance of the 
premiums is to be used for insurance losses and other 
operational costs of Exchange and may be distributed to its 
members as dividends at the discretion of Indemnity.     
 
The Complaint alleges that members of Exchange who 
pay their insurance premiums in installments must also pay 
service charges, and that members are also subject to late 
payment and policy reinstatement fees.  The Complaint also 
claims that, beginning in 1997, Indemnity began to retain for 
itself the service charges that certain members paid to 
Exchange, which monies belonged to Exchange, and that, 
beginning in 2008, Indemnity misappropriated the late 
5 
payment and policy reinstatement fees, totaling over $300 
million dollars.   
 
 
B. Procedural History 
 
The Complaint names Exchange as plaintiff, and states 
that Exchange brings the suit “by” four of its individual 
members as “trustees ad litem” (“Individual Members”).  J.A. 
28.  Further, each Individual Member is said to bring the suit 
“on behalf of all members of Exchange.”  Compl. ¶¶ 1-4.  
The action was purportedly brought “pursuant to Pa. R. Civ. 
P. 2152,” id. ¶ 4, which provides that “[a]n action prosecuted 
by an association shall be prosecuted in the name of a 
member or members thereof as trustees ad litem for such 
association.  An action so prosecuted shall be entitled „X 
Association by A and B, Trustees ad Litem‟ against the party 
defendant.”  Pa. R. Civ. P. 2152.   
 
The Complaint pleads three counts under state law: (1) 
breach of contract, alleging that the “plaintiffs herein 
sustained damages” as a result of Indemnity‟s breach of the 
Subscriber‟s Agreement in retaining services charges, and 
seeking relief “on behalf of all members of” Exchange; (2) 
breach of fiduciary duty, also seeking relief on behalf of the 
members of Exchange; and (3) “equity,” requesting relief in 
the amount of misappropriated funds “on behalf of 
Exchange.”  Id. ¶¶ 30-47. 
 
Indemnity filed a notice of removal, arguing that this 
case constitutes a “class action within the meaning of the 
Class Action Fairness Act.”  J.A. 21.  After the case was 
transferred to the District Court for the Western District of 
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Pennsylvania, plaintiffs moved to remand, arguing that this 
case does not constitute a “class action” as that term is used in 
CAFA, and that, in the alternative, CAFA‟s diversity of 
citizenship requirement is not met.  Indemnity responded that, 
among other arguments, the suit was improperly brought 
under Rule 2152 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  As noted, Rule 2152 sets forth how suits on 
behalf of “associations” are to be prosecuted under 
Pennsylvania law.  However, the Pennsylvania rules define 
“associations” to exclude entities that are “corporations or 
similar entit[ies],” such as “insurance association[s] or 
exchange[s].”  Pa. R. Civ. P. 2176; see also Pa. R. Civ. P. 
2151.  Pennsylvania law provides that actions on behalf of 
such “a corporation or similar entity” instead “shall be 
prosecuted . . . in its corporate name.”  Pa. R. Civ. P. 2177.  
Thus, the Original Complaint would not seem to fit under 
Rule 2152. 
 
An amended complaint was filed while the motion for 
remand was pending (the “Amended Complaint”).  The 
Amended Complaint contains no references to Rule 2152, no 
longer requests relief “on behalf of” individual members of 
Exchange, and asserts that it is brought by individual 
members “on behalf of Exchange.”  J.A. 72, ¶¶ 1-4. 
 
In October 2012, the District Court granted plaintiffs‟ 
motion to remand the case, concluding that it does not 
constitute a “class action” under CAFA.  Indemnity filed a 
timely petition for leave to appeal, which we granted on 
February 14, 2013. 
 
While the petition for appeal was pending, three of the 
four Individual Members filed a lawsuit in the District Court 
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for the Western District of Pennsylvania (the “Federal 
Lawsuit”).  The complaint in that case stated two alternative 
causes of action—one styled as a class action by the 
individual members on behalf of all the members of 
Exchange, and the other a non-class action on behalf of 
Exchange by its members.  See Compl. at 2, Erie Ins. Exch. v. 
Stover, No. 1:13-cv-37 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 2013).  The Federal 
Lawsuit names as defendants certain trustees of Exchange, 
allegedly appointed by Indemnity and responsible for 
permitting Indemnity to take funds from Exchange, the same 
funds that are at issue in this lawsuit.   
 
II. 
 
CAFA grants us appellate jurisdiction to review the 
District Court‟s remand order.  28 U.S.C. § 1453(c).  But the 
basic question we must resolve is whether a federal court has 
subject matter jurisdiction to hear this case in the first 
instance.  Indemnity, as the party seeking removal, bears the 
burden of establishing that federal subject matter jurisdiction 
exists.  Kaufman v. Allstate New Jersey Ins. Co., 561 F.3d 
144, 151 (3d Cir. 2009).  To evaluate whether removal is 
proper, we generally focus on the allegations in the 
Complaint and the notice of removal.  Id.
1
   
 
A. 
 
CAFA gives federal courts subject matter jurisdiction 
over “class actions” if the suit meets certain requirements, 
                                              
1
 We review issues of subject matter jurisdiction, and the 
statutory interpretation issues raised in this case, de novo.  
Morgan v. Gay, 471 F.3d 469, 472 (3d Cir. 2006). 
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such as involving an amount in controversy over $5 million in 
the aggregate and involving at least one plaintiff who is a 
resident of a jurisdiction different than that of at least one 
defendant.  28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A).  The principal dispute 
here, however, is whether this case even constitutes a “class 
action.” 
 
We begin, of course, with CAFA‟s language, which 
defines a “class action” as “any civil action filed under rule 
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or similar State 
statute or rule of judicial procedure authorizing an action to 
be brought by 1 or more representative persons as a class 
action.”  28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(B).  Like the other Courts of 
Appeals to have construed CAFA‟s definition of “class 
action,” we find “no ambiguity” in the text of the law and 
Indemnity points to none.  Washington v. Chimei Innolux 
Corp., 659 F.3d 842, 848 (9th Cir. 2011).  The statute directs 
us to inquire whether this action was brought under a “state 
statute or rule” that is “similar” to Rule 23 or, in other words, 
“whether the state statute authorizes the suit „as a class 
action.‟”  Id.2   
 
Indemnity has made no attempt to argue that this 
dispute meets the statutory definition of class action.  
Notably, Indemnity does not contend that the Complaint was 
                                              
2
 The relevant portions of Rule 23 provide that “[o]ne or more 
members of a class may sue or be sued as representative 
parties on behalf of all members only if” numerosity, 
commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation are 
met, and if the class meets other requirements and is certified 
by the court as a class after following certain notice 
procedures.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)-(c). 
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filed pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, or under any state statute or rule that is “similar” 
to Rule 23 or that otherwise authorizes an action to be 
brought by a representative as a class action.  Nor could it.  
As noted, this action was originally brought pursuant to Rule 
2152 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 
2152”), which allows suits on behalf of an unincorporated 
association to be prosecuted by its members.
3
  But Rule 2152 
contains none of the defining characteristics of Rule 23 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 23”).  It does not, for 
example, provide for class certification mechanisms, Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 23(c)(1), list requirements such as numerosity or 
commonality that a suit must meet to constitute a class action, 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)-(b),
4
 or specify the form and substance 
of notice that must be given to absent class members, Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 23(c)(2).  Nor does Rule 2152 permit individual class 
members to opt-out or provide for the appointment of a lead 
plaintiff or class counsel.  Far from “authorizing an action to 
be brought by [a] representative person[] as a class,” 28 
                                              
3
 As noted, the Amended Complaint removed references to 
Rule 2152 and purported to be brought under Rule 2177.  But, 
as Indemnity points out, jurisdiction is analyzed “as of the 
time [the case] was filed in state court.”  Standard Fire Ins. 
Co. v. Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 1345, 1349 (2013); see also 
Kaufman, 561 F.3d at 152.  We therefore consider the 
jurisdictional inquiry by reference to the Original Complaint, 
and do not consider the Amended Complaint. 
 
4
 Rather than contain a numerosity requirement, Rule 2152 is 
not limited to suits involving associations of a certain size.  It 
appears that an action by an association with, say, two 
members, may be instituted under Rule 2152. 
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U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(B), Rule 2152 merely authorizes suits by 
representatives on behalf of an unincorporated association.  
See Pa. R. Civ. P. 2152.  Indeed, to the extent we have 
interpreted Pennsylvania law on the matter, we have held that 
suits by members of an unincorporated association (such as 
those contemplated by Rule 2152) may not be brought as a 
class action.  See Underwood v. Maloney, 256 F.2d 334, 337 
(3d Cir. 1958) (“Pennsylvania has forbidden a suit by or 
against an unincorporated association to be maintained as a 
class action.”). 
 
Indemnity and the District Court noted that, under 
Pennsylvania law, Rule 2152 is not the proper vehicle for a 
lawsuit by an insurance exchange.  The District Court 
explained that a suit by such entity must be prosecuted under 
Rule 2177 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure 
(“Rule 2177”), which requires suits by insurance exchanges 
to be filed “in [their] corporate name.”  Pa. R. Civ. P. 2177.  
This may be so, but despite Rule 2176‟s exclusion of 
insurance exchanges from  “unincorporated associations,” 
there is Pennsylvania authority permitting a suit by an 
insurance exchange to be prosecuted in the same way suits by 
other unincorporated associations are prosecuted under Rule 
2152, i.e. “by some of the members in their own names on 
behalf of or as representing all.”  Barford v. Beaner Elec. Co., 
11 Pa. D. & C. 51, 55 (Pa. Ct. Common Pleas 1927).  Thus, 
under either Rule, a suit by Exchange is properly understood 
as a suit by one entity, not by “a conglomerate of 
individuals.”  Long v. Sakleson, 195 A. 416, 420 (Pa. 1937).  
Moreover, Rule 2177 is even less like Rule 23 in that it 
contains none of Rule 23‟s class-related requirements, and, 
unlike Rule 2152, does not even explicitly contemplate a suit 
filed by a member “on behalf of” an association. 
11 
 
In any event, we need not resolve the state-law 
question of whether Rule 2152 or Rule 2177 provides the 
proper basis for filing a suit by an insurance exchange, a 
question “we only see through Erie‟s glass darkly.”  Purdue 
Pharma L.P. v. Kentucky, 704 F.3d 208, 220 (2d Cir. 2013).  
Plaintiffs are the masters of their complaints and are “free to 
choose the statutory provisions under which they will bring 
their claims.”  Id. at 216 n.7; see also Standard Fire Ins. Co. 
v. Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 1345, 1350 (2013).  If the case is 
procedurally unsound under Pennsylvania‟s rules, the 
Commonwealth‟s courts are best suited to correct the 
problem.  We will not rewrite the Complaint to create 
jurisdiction under the pretense of correcting a state-law error. 
 
By contrast to these rules, Rules 1701 through 1704 of 
the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure contain specific 
requirements for a lawsuit to be brought as a class action, 
many of which mirror the requirements of Rule 23.  See Pa. 
R. Civ. P. 1702 (listing numerosity, commonality, and 
typicality requirements of Pennsylvania class actions); Pa. R. 
Civ. P. 1704 (requiring separate heading for “Class Action 
allegations”).  There is no contention that this case was 
brought under such rules, other than Indemnity‟s attempt to 
equate, without citation to any authority, a suit filed “on 
behalf of all members of Exchange” to a class suit under Rule 
1701.  See Appellant‟s Br. at 10 n.4.  Our own precedent 
belies Indemnity‟s attempt to characterize a suit brought “on 
behalf of” members of an association as a class action.  See 
12 
Underwood, 256 F.2d at 337.
5
  Plain and simple, this is a suit 
by an entity, not a class of individuals. 
 
Our holding does not require “a formalistic search 
through the pages of the complaint for magic words,” as 
Indemnity suggests.  Appellant‟s Br. at 14 n.7 (citing Segal v. 
Fifth Third Bank, N.A., 581 F.3d 305, 310 (6th Cir. 2009)).  
Instead, as per Congress‟s command, we reach our holding by 
looking to the rule under which a case was filed.  “[N]o 
amount of piercing the pleadings will change the statute or 
rule under which the case is filed.  If this is a formalistic 
outcome, it is a formalism dictated by Congress.”  In re Vioxx 
Prods. Liab. Litig., 843 F. Supp. 2d 654, 664 (E.D. La. 2012).   
 
B. 
 
Unable to meet the clear statutory definition of “class 
action,” Indemnity resorts to a series of extra-textual 
arguments and to a complicated analysis of the Complaint, in 
an attempt to meet its burden of establishing removal by 
convincing us that “there is more to this case than meets the 
eye.”  Purdue, 704 F.3d at 217.  We are not persuaded. 
 
Indemnity points to CAFA‟s legislative history, which 
it contends dictates that CAFA‟s application of class action 
“should not be confined solely to lawsuits that are labeled 
„class actions.‟”  Appellant‟s Br. at 12 (citing S. Rep. No. 
                                              
5
 Indemnity‟s only attempt to come to terms with the 
language of the statute is in a footnote, where Indemnity 
labels as “restrictive” an analysis focused on CAFA‟s textual 
definition of “class action.”  See Appellant‟s Br. at 10 n.4.  
We disagree with that characterization. 
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109-14, at 35 (2005)).  But this general legislative statement 
does nothing to tip the scales in Indemnity‟s favor.  It neither 
modifies the statutory command of which suits are to be 
considered class actions, nor provides a test by which to 
answer the question of whether a suit constitutes a “class 
action.”  We do not quarrel with the view that “class actions” 
are not only cases labeled as such, but our holding does not 
turn on the fact that that label is missing from the Complaint.  
Rather, it turns on the fact that this case was not brought 
pursuant to any rule sufficiently similar to Rule 23, and that 
Indemnity has not pointed to any rule that would even permit 
a suit by an exchange through its members to be brought as a 
class action under Pennsylvania law.  Cf. Chimei, 659 F.3d at 
849-50 (rejecting the argument that “liberally” defining “class 
action” required finding that a suit that had some resemblance 
to a class action was a CAFA “class action”).6 
 
In a related argument, Indemnity asks that we look at 
the “substance” of the allegations in the Complaint and ignore 
“formalistic” labels to determine whether removal is proper.  
Appellant‟s Br. at 9-10.  This argument is most curious, as 
with its very next argument Indemnity urges that we focus 
                                              
6
 Our dissenting colleague similarly relies extensively on 
CAFA‟s legislative history and suggests that our decision 
“contravenes Congress‟s intent” in enacting that law.  Dissent 
at 1, 2, 7, 9.  But CAFA‟s legislative history is particularly 
suspect given that it represents the views of only a handful of 
the legislators voting for the law.  See Brill v. Countrywide 
Home Loans, 427 F.3d 446, 448 (7th Cir. 2005) (explaining 
that Senate Report was signed by only thirteen of 82 senators 
voting for CAFA and thus has less “force than an opinion poll 
of legislators”). 
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narrowly on Complaint‟s use of the words “on behalf of,” and 
on the differences between the prayer for relief in Counts One 
and Two compared to that in Count Three to conclude that 
this case really is a class action.  Id. at 10-11.  Indemnity even 
suggests that the use of the plural of “plaintiff” means that 
this is a representative suit.  Id. at 11.  But Indemnity cannot 
invoke subject matter jurisdiction by cherry-picking key 
words from a complaint any more than a plaintiff can 
artificially deprive a federal court of subject matter 
jurisdiction by artful pleading or labeling.  Failing to affix 
“class action” to a pleading can no more deprive us of 
jurisdiction than using the words “on behalf of,” or the plural 
of “plaintiff,” can magically confer it. 
 
Finally, Indemnity notes that “Exchange . . . is not a 
party to” the Subscriber‟s Agreements that form the basis of 
the claims in the Complaint.  Id. at 10.  Presumably, the thrust 
of this argument is that Exchange‟s members are the “real 
party in interest” to this suit.  But, this confuses the state-law 
question of who may properly bring this case with the 
question of whether this case was filed pursuant to a rule 
sufficiently similar to Rule 23.  And, in any event, this 
argument proves too much.  As noted, Exchange is an 
unincorporated entity with no management or directors.  Its 
only ability to contract, or otherwise perform legal acts, is 
either through Indemnity itself or through its members.  In 
other words, the fact that each individual member had to sign 
a Subscriber‟s Agreement is inherent in the nature of an entity 
such as Exchange.  If Indemnity‟s arguments were accepted, 
all suits by an insurance exchange against its attorney-in-
fact—necessarily prosecuted by individual members—will 
always be treated as class actions.  We know of nothing in 
Pennsylvania‟s rules that evince any intent to reach this 
15 
strange result.  To the contrary, Pennsylvania law suggests 
that such suits should not be considered to be class actions.  
See, e.g., Pa. R. Civ. P. 2177; Long, 195 A. at 421 (suit 
against an insurance exchange is not against “a conglomerate 
of individuals”).7 
 
Far from helping Indemnity, its “substance of the 
claims” arguments convince us that this case is not properly 
viewed as a class action.  Even if this case were viewed as a 
suit by all of Exchange‟s members against Indemnity on 
Exchange‟s behalf, it would still bear little resemblance to a 
Rule 23 action.  The group of individuals that comprise 
Exchange exists to pool resources and buy insurance and will 
continue to exist beyond the life of this suit.  By contrast, a 
“class” in a class action is a group of individuals whose legal 
association normally begins and ends with the lawsuit, which 
is not the case here.  Nor do we see any indication that 
members of Exchange can opt in or out of the suit (which will 
bind Exchange), or that they are entitled to notice, an 
opportunity to object, or to be appointed lead plaintiff.   
 
As for whatever recovery may be obtained at the 
conclusion of this litigation, Indemnity does not contend that 
it belongs to Exchange‟s individual members.  To the 
contrary, the Complaint alleges that the misappropriated 
                                              
7
 CAFA itself evinces an intent that suits by unincorporated 
associations be treated like suits by corporations in that the 
citizenship of the association for diversity purposes is 
determined by the entity‟s principal place of business and not 
by the citizenship of its members.  See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(d)(10). 
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funds were paid to Exchange.  See Compl. ¶¶ 24, 25 (alleging 
that Indemnity retained moneys “previously received by 
Exchange”).  It is true that Exchange‟s members will 
indirectly benefit from any recovery that goes to Exchange‟s 
pool of assets.  But that fact does not make this case a class 
action any more than a lawsuit by, say, a regular corporation 
is a class action simply because its shareholders indirectly 
benefit from the corporation‟s recovery in the suit. 
 
Accordingly, Indemnity‟s additional arguments, which 
have already taken us far afield from a straightforward 
application of the unambiguous definition of class action to 
this case, must be rejected.
8
 
 
C. 
 
Finally, Indemnity invokes a general notion of 
estoppel and argues that because the subsequently-filed 
Federal Lawsuit arises “out of the same nucleus of operative 
fact” as this action, we should conclude that it constitutes an 
attempt at “forum manipulation,” Appellant‟s Br. at 17, and 
therefore keep this case in federal court.  There are two 
fundamental problems with this argument. 
 
  First, it ignores the axiomatic principle that in 
deciding a motion for remand the proper inquiry is whether 
                                              
8
 In light of our conclusion that Indemnity has failed to meet 
its threshold burden of establishing that this case is a “class 
action,” we need not reach Exchange‟s argument that minimal 
diversity of citizenship is defeated.  See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(d)(2).  However, as stated, CAFA itself suggests that 
this argument is correct.  See supra n.6. 
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jurisdiction existed “as of the time [the case] was filed in state 
court.”  Knowles, 133 S. Ct. at 1349.  Indemnity itself 
recognizes this principle in the context of attacking the 
District Court‟s analysis of the Amended Complaint.  See 
Appellant‟s Br. at 15.  We are not permitted, by CAFA or 
otherwise, to hold that the subsequent filing of a lawsuit may 
create subject matter jurisdiction over a previously filed suit, 
where no jurisdiction existed in the first place. 
 
Second, Indemnity‟s argument confuses questions 
regarding Exchange‟s capacity to sue with questions of 
subject matter jurisdiction.  “[I]ssues pertaining to the 
capacity to sue . . . are deserving of consideration only after 
the jurisdiction of the federal court has been firmly 
established.”  Carlsberg Res. Corp. v. Cambria Sav. & Loan 
Ass’n., 554 F.2d 1254, 1260 (3d Cir. 1977).  The effect of 
allegedly adopting differing positions regarding capacity to 
sue will be addressed, if necessary, by either the state court 
handling this case or the federal court handling the Federal 
Lawsuit, as the case may be.   
 
The cases that Indemnity relies on demonstrate that 
doctrines such as judicial estoppel and res judicata equip 
courts to address situations in which plaintiffs file multiple 
lawsuits or adopt contradictory litigation postures.  See, e.g., 
Turner v. Crawford Square Apartments III, L.P., 449 F.3d 
542, 551 (3d Cir. 2006).  But federal courts are courts of 
limited powers, and those remedies do not permit us to create 
subject matter jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Ins. Corp. of Ireland, 
Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 
(1982) (explaining that “no action of the parties can confer” 
jurisdiction because “principles of estoppel do not apply” to 
the question of whether jurisdiction exists).  We therefore 
18 
decline to apply equitable principles in a way that would 
impermissibly expand federal judicial power in violation of 
Article III.
9
 
 
III. 
 
This case was not filed under any rule that 
contemplates class proceedings, and Indemnity does not 
contend otherwise.  It therefore fails to meet the statutory 
definition of “class action” and may not properly be removed 
under CAFA.  Even after accepting Indemnity‟s invitation to 
perform an analysis beyond what CAFA‟s text requires, and 
to wade through the complaint in hopes of concluding that 
something else is afoot, we have failed to uncover any 
evidence that this case is really a class action wolf dressed in 
sheep‟s clothing.   
 
The District Court‟s judgment is AFFIRMED. 
                                              
9
 Nor will we “fashion a rule” that directs consolidation of 
this case with the Federal Lawsuit.  See Appellant‟s Br. at 19.  
Aside from the fact that such remedy would result in our 
exercising jurisdiction contrary to the state court‟s authority, 
this case is nothing like Freeman v. Blue Ridge Paper Prods., 
Inc., 551 F.3d 405 (6th Cir. 2008), on which Indemnity relies 
for its proposed consolidation rule.  In Freeman, the Court 
found that the lawsuit was artificially separated into several 
state court cases for the explicit purposes of avoiding “federal 
jurisdiction.”  Id. at 407.  Here, by contrast, the separate 
action was brought not in state court but in federal court, 
undermining any contention that it was brought to avoid 
“federal jurisdiction.” 
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Erie Insurance Exchange et al. v. Erie Indemnity Co. 
 
No. 13-1415 
 
          
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge, dissenting:  
 I respectfully dissent because I believe that the 
Complaint is a class action for purposes of CAFA 
jurisdiction.  CAFA‟s primary objective is to ensure 
“[f]ederal court consideration of interstate cases of national 
importance.”  Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, --- U.S. ----, 
133 S. Ct. 1345, 1350 (2013) (quoting Class Action Fairness 
Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(b)(2), 119 Stat. 4).  The 
majority‟s requirement that a class action must be brought 
under Rule 23 or a similar state statute or rule that explicitly 
authorizes a class action goes too far and contravenes 
Congress‟s intent that “lawsuits that resemble a purported 
class action should be considered class actions.”  S. Rep. No. 
109-14, at 35 (2005).   
 
 I would hold that a civil suit is a class action for 
purposes of CAFA jurisdiction when it pleads facts that 
would fulfill the essential elements of a class action – 
numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of 
representation.  Simply put, if it quacks like a class action, it 
is a class action.  The Complaint here quacks.  It pleads facts 
that would satisfy the elements of a class action; therefore, it 
is a class action under CAFA.  The District Court erred in 
remanding this case back to state court.  
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The basis for my conviction that the District Court 
erred goes back to Congress‟s reason for enacting CAFA.  
Congress wanted to “expand substantially federal court 
jurisdiction over class actions.”  S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 43 
(2005); see also Kaufman v. Allstate New Jersey Ins. Co., 561 
F.3d 144, 148-49 (3d Cir. 2009).  The Senate Committee 
Report on CAFA explains that Congress was concerned that 
class actions were too often excluded from federal court.  S. 
Rep. No. 109-14, at 4 (2005).  This led to the adjudication of 
these cases in state courts, which inconsistently applied the 
rules governing class actions and inadequately supervised 
litigation procedures and proposed settlements.  Id.  Congress 
was frustrated that lawyers could “„game‟ the procedural 
rules and keep nationwide or multi-state class actions in state 
courts.”  Id.  This was especially troubling since class actions 
strongly implicate concerns about judicial integrity and 
interstate commerce.  See id. at 8. 
 
Consequently, CAFA “places the determination of 
more interstate class action lawsuits in the proper forum – the 
federal courts.”  Id. at 4.  Class actions “usually involve the 
most people, most money, and most interstate commerce 
issues” and “also usually involve issues [with] nationwide 
implications,” so they are “precisely the kind of cases that 
should be heard in federal court.”  Id. at 53.  CAFA lists as 
one of its purposes to “restore the intent of the framers of the 
United States Constitution by providing for Federal court 
consideration of interstate cases of national importance under 
diversity jurisdiction,” § 2(b)(2), and “the overall intent of 
[CAFA‟s] provisions is to strongly favor the exercise of 
federal diversity jurisdiction over class actions with interstate 
ramifications.”  S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 35 (2005).  Congress‟s 
desire that federal courts have broad jurisdictional power to 
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hear class actions cannot be ignored when interpreting the 
plain language of CAFA. 
A. 
While the majority accuses Indemnity of cherry-
picking words to show that this is a class action, see Majority 
at 14, a close reading of the whole Complaint reveals that it 
seeks relief for individuals and pleads facts that would 
support the four prerequisites of a class action under Rule 23.
1
  
First of all, as the Complaint indicates, this is an interstate 
case of national importance.  Exchange‟s more than two 
million subscribers hail from ten states and the District of 
Columbia and, pursuant to their membership, enter into 
contracts for insurance with and receive dividends from 
Exchange throughout that geographic territory.  Indemnity, a 
public corporation, manages and conducts Exchange‟s 
business affairs by, inter alia, issuing policies, collecting 
premiums, and investing Exchange‟s funds, activities which 
certainly occur across several states.  This lawsuit, which 
challenges Indemnity‟s conduct in managing Exchange, thus 
implicates interstate commerce. 
 
Moving to the particulars of the Complaint, its first 
page states that it is filed on behalf of “All members of Erie 
Insurance Exchange[,]” and under the description of the 
parties, each identified subscriber “is filing this complaint on 
                                                          
1
 I agree with the majority that jurisdiction is analyzed “as of 
the time [the case] was filed in state court.”  Knowles, 133 S. 
Ct. at 1349; see Majority at 9 n.3.  As a result, whether there 
is jurisdiction under CAFA in this case is based solely on the 
Complaint that was originally filed in the Court of Common 
Pleas. 
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behalf of all members of Exchange.”  The first count, for 
breach of contract, is necessarily brought on behalf of all of 
the subscribers because the Subscriber‟s Agreements are 
between each individual subscriber and Indemnity.  Exchange 
would not have standing to bring a breach of contract claim 
related to the Subscriber‟s Agreements because Exchange is 
not a party to the Subscriber‟s Agreements.   
 
The second count, for breach of fiduciary duty, also 
must be brought on behalf of the subscribers because the 
Complaint alleges that Indemnity is a “fiduciary for Exchange 
and its Subscribers” and “breached those duties.”  Even if 
Indemnity breached a duty owed to Exchange, the Complaint 
also alleges that Indemnity breached duties it owed to all of 
the subscribers, which only they can vindicate.  Both of these 
counts conclude by seeking relief for individuals by stating 
that “the plaintiffs, on behalf of all members of Exchange, 
request a sum . . ..”  In contrast, the third count states that the 
claim is brought “on behalf of Exchange,” rather than on 
behalf of “all members of Exchange,” further indicating that 
the first two counts seek individual relief for all of the 
subscribers.  The language in the Complaint, as well as the 
nature of the claims, indicates it was filed on behalf of all of 
the subscribers and seeks individual relief for all of the 
subscribers.   
 
Also significant is the fact that the complaint in the 
Federal Lawsuit asserts it is a class action and alleges nearly 
identical facts to those alleged in the Complaint here.
2
  Both 
                                                          
2
 As the majority acknowledges, while this appeal has been 
pending, three of the plaintiffs have brought a class action in 
federal court on behalf of all members of Exchange.  See 
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complaints describe Exchange as an unincorporated 
association comprised of subscribers and Indemnity‟s role as 
managing the operation of Exchange‟s insurance business.  
Both complaints allege that Indemnity improperly retained 
over $300 million worth of services charges, itemized by 
year, and the Federal Lawsuit, much like the Complaint here, 
“requests damages . . .” for a named subscriber “on behalf of 
herself and others similarly situate[d].”  Moreover, the 
Federal Lawsuit, also pleading in the alternative a derivative 
action, states that “a formal demand in this matter would be 
fruitless,” in part, because the Complaint at issue here was 
filed against Indemnity in the Court of Common Pleas.  The 
Federal Lawsuit seeks the same relief for the same people for 
the same alleged wrong as the Complaint here.  While the 
majority is correct that this later-filed complaint does not 
“create” federal jurisdiction, see Majority at 17, it does 
demonstrate that the facts that were pled – in both complaints 
– support the elements of a class action.  Both complaints are 
quacking like ducks – whether or not the words “class action” 
are used or Rule 23 and its particulars are explicitly listed. 
 
Moreover, as my review indicates, the Complaint 
pleads facts that would satisfy the four prerequisites of a class 
action – numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy 
of representation.  Beginning with the first requirement, 
Exchange has over two million subscribers that reside in ten 
states and the District of Columbia, and the Complaint seeks 
individual relief for all of these subscribers.  These facts 
satisfy the numerosity requirement because it would be 
impracticable to join all of these plaintiffs in one lawsuit that 
                                                                                                                                  
Complaint, Erie Ins. Exchange v. Stover, No. 1:13-cv-37 
(W.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 2013). 
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is not a class action.  The second class action requirement, 
commonality, is met because the Complaint alleges that 
Indemnity breached a contract that it had entered into with 
each subscriber and breached the fiduciary duty it owed to 
each subscriber.  As a result, the questions of law and fact are 
common to the class of individual subscribers on whose 
behalf relief is sought.  Additionally, the allegations that each 
subscriber has the same claims against Indemnity that the four 
named subscribers have satisfies the third class action 
requirement of typicality.  Finally, the fourth requirement, 
adequacy of representation, is satisfied by the factual 
allegations in the Complaint that each subscriber has an 
identical relationship with Exchange.  Thus, the four named 
plaintiffs would fairly and adequately protect the interests of 
the class because all of the subscribers have identical interests 
vis-à-vis Indemnity.   
A close reading of the Complaint reveals that it pleads 
facts that would satisfy the four essential requirements of a 
class action.  For purposes of jurisdiction under CAFA, this 
Complaint then is a class action.  Because this case meets the 
other requirements for CAFA jurisdiction, a federal court 
should exercise its jurisdiction over it and deal later with any 
deficiencies in the Complaint as pled.
3
  
                                                          
3
 CAFA provides for federal jurisdiction over class actions 
that also have (1) minimal diversity; (2) an amount in 
controversy over $5 million; and (3) a proposed class that 
consists of at least 100 members. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2); 20 
U.S.C. § 1332(d)(5).  The Complaint also meets these 
requirements.  Subscribers are citizens of ten different states 
and the District of Columbia while Indemnity is a 
Pennsylvania citizen, creating minimal diversity.  The 
Complaint alleges that Indemnity improperly retained over 
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B. 
When the defendants moved for removal under CAFA, 
the District Court should have reviewed the Complaint – as 
we do above – to determine whether the requirements of a 
class action were present.  In doing so, it should have kept in 
mind what Congress intended in creating CAFA.  The 
Committee Report instructs that “the definition of „class 
action‟ is to be interpreted liberally.”  S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 
35 (2005).  I agree with the majority that determining whether 
a civil suit is a class action begins with the definition of class 
action in § 1332(d)(1)(B).  However, the role of the court in a 
CAFA case does not end there.  The court must also 
determine, based on a close reading of the entire complaint, 
whether the complaint pleads facts that would satisfy the 
essential elements of a class action, namely numerosity, 
commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation.  If a 
complaint, on its face, satisfies these requirements, under 
CAFA it is properly removed to federal court.  It is then the 
function of the district court to inquire whether there are any 
deficiencies in the complaint.  If so, the court should either 
                                                                                                                                  
$300 million worth of fees, and neither party has alleged that 
the amount in controversy is less than the required $5 million.  
Finally, the proposed class consists of at least 100 members 
because the class consists of all members of Exchange, of 
which there are over two million.  This lawsuit meets the 
requirements for federal jurisdiction under CAFA, and the 
District Court erred in remanding the case. 
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have them corrected or dismiss the complaint.
4
  This 
approach ensures that interstate class action lawsuits are 
litigated in federal court, as CAFA intended. 
 
 A putative class must demonstrate numerosity, 
commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation 
when bringing a class action, so it logically follows that to 
qualify as a class action for purposes of CAFA jurisdiction, a 
complaint should plead facts that would fulfill these 
requirements.  Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 
591 (3d Cir. 2012); Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a); see also, e.g., Pa. R. 
Civ. P. 1702.  These requirements are the essence of Rule 23 
and similar state rules so that even a complaint that does not 
identify itself as “filed under” this type of rule can 
nonetheless be “filed under” these rules for purposes of 
CAFA jurisdiction.  Stated another way, a complaint that 
pleads facts that would fulfill the four essential requirements 
of a class action is “filed under rule 23 . . . or a similar state 
statute or rule . . . authorizing an action to be brought . . . as a 
class action” even if the complaint fails to name or exactly 
mirror the applicable rule.  See Majority at 8 (citing 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(d)(1)(B)). 
 
Moreover, we cannot require that a class action 
complaint include specific words or refer to specific 
procedural rules because, as the Supreme Court has 
admonished, courts should not “exalt form over substance” 
when determining jurisdiction under CAFA.  Knowles, 133 S. 
                                                          
4
 For example, if a complaint lacks mechanisms for notifying 
potential class members or allowing them to opt-out – but 
otherwise pleads a class action – the district court may 
remedy this deficiency once jurisdiction is established. 
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Ct. at 1350; see S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 35 (2005) (“[CAFA‟s] 
application should not be confined solely to lawsuits that are 
labeled „class actions‟ by the named plaintiff or the state 
rulemaking authority.”).  “A complaint that contains class-
type allegations historically has been assumed to assert a class 
action before formal class certification.”  Coll. of Dental 
Surgeons of P.R. v. Conn. Gen. Ins. Co., 585 F.3d 33, 40 (1st 
Cir. 2009).   
 
Indeed, this Court has held in other contexts that when 
determining jurisdiction, courts “are not bound by the label 
attached by a party to characterize a claim and will look 
beyond the label to analyze the substance of the claim.”  
Jarbough v. Att’y Gen., 483 F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir. 2007); 
Centifanti v. Nix, 865 F.2d 1422, 1429 n.8 (3d Cir. 1989); see 
also La. ex rel. Caldwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 536 F.3d 418, 
424 (5th Cir. 2008) (noting in a case dealing with CAFA that 
federal courts look to the substance of an action, not how it is 
labeled, when determining whether there is jurisdiction).  
Under this approach, a court will look beyond the rule a 
plaintiff may use to characterize the claim and instead look to 
the specific facts pled.  If these facts would satisfy the four 
class action prerequisites, the complaint pleads a class action 
for purposes of CAFA jurisdiction.  
 
The majority‟s holding that CAFA requires that a class 
action be “filed pursuant to Rule 23 . . . or under any state 
statute or rule that is similar to Rule 23,” see Majority at 8, 
entails too formalistic an inquiry.  CAFA does not require that 
a complaint methodically apply Rule 23 or a state law 
analogue, and the majority‟s implicit requirement that this 
Complaint do so is just a small step away from requiring a 
lawsuit to contain specific words to be a class action.  It 
10 
 
should be of no moment that a litigant failed to explicitly 
mention a class action rule or deficiently pled a complaint 
under that rule because, “like the rest of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Rule 23 automatically applies „in all civil 
actions and proceedings in United States district courts.‟”  
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 
393, 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1438 (2010) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 1); 
see Fed. R. Civ. P. 81.  The substance of a complaint 
determines which procedural rules apply.
5
  Even parties that 
agree a complaint pleads a class action may use discovery to 
bolster the complaint‟s compliance with Rule 23.  Much like 
an improperly pled federal cause of action, deficiencies in a 
complaint that pleads facts satisfying the essential elements of 
a class action do not deprive a federal district court of subject 
matter jurisdiction, though the complaint may ultimately fail. 
 
Moreover, application of the majority‟s approach to 
the Complaint further demonstrates that their emphasis on the 
particular rules referred to in the Complaint is misplaced.  
The fact that Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 2152 
contains “none of the defining characteristics of Rule 23,” see 
Majority at 9, does not mean that the facts alleged in the 
Complaint do not require the District Court to apply Rule 23 
                                                          
5
 As a result, if this case were to remain in federal court, as I 
believe it should, the District Court could ensure that the 
requisite procedural rules are followed with respect to class 
certification, notice to absent class members, opt-out 
provisions, and the appointment of lead plaintiff and class 
counsel, despite the absence of any explicit mention of these 
procedural details in the Complaint.   
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to correct any deficiencies in the pleading or dismiss the 
case.
6, 7
 
                                                          
6
 And as the majority itself notes, the fact that the Complaint 
states that the plaintiffs “bring this action pursuant to 
Pa.R.Civ.P. 2152” may be an incorrect application of the law 
because Exchange is a corporate entity, not an unincorporated 
association.  See Majority at 10; Pa. R. Civ. P. 2176 (“[A] 
corporation or similar entity includes any . . . insurance 
association or exchange.”).  Thus, relying on the facts 
actually pled, rather than the plaintiffs‟ assessment of their 
own claims, is more likely to identify cases that are truly class 
actions and that involve the interstate ramifications about 
which Congress was concerned when it enacted CAFA. 
 
7
 To the extent that the majority relies on Pennsylvania‟s 
prohibition of class actions by unincorporated associations, 
they are also misguided.  The majority cites Underwood v. 
Maloney, 256 F.3d 334, 337 (3d Cir. 1958), for the 
proposition that “suits by members of an unincorporated 
association (such as those contemplated by Rule 2152) may 
not be brought as a class action.” See Majority at 10 
(emphasis in original).  Underwood cites as support for this 
proposition, inter alia, the Note to Pennsylvania Rule 
2230(a), which explicitly states that “suits by or against 
unincorporated associations are not to be brought as class 
suits under this Rule.” Note to Pa. R. Civ. P. 2230(a) 
(rescinded 1977).  Since the decision in Underwood, Rule 
2230, which addressed class actions, has been rescinded and 
Rules 1701-04 have been enacted in its place.  These new 
class action rules neither include a similar note nor explicitly 
address whether class actions may be brought by 
unincorporated associations.  Moreover, as described in Part 
12 
 
Finally, the majority‟s approach is also inconsistent 
with Congress‟s intent that CAFA broadly confer jurisdiction 
on federal district courts to hear class actions.   The 
majority‟s approach makes it easier for plaintiffs to forum 
shop and “game” the system.  As a result of the requirement 
in Knowles that CAFA jurisdiction be determined based on 
only the original complaint, 133 S. Ct. at 1349-50,
 
a 
strategically-pled complaint could remain banished to state 
court if the plaintiffs adequately disguise any class claims by 
inaccurately filing them under a non-class action procedural 
rule.  This cannot be what Congress intended.   
 
I would hold today that a civil complaint which pleads 
facts that could satisfy the four prerequisites of a class action 
– numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of 
representation – is a class action for purposes of CAFA 
jurisdiction.  A close reading of the Complaint here reveals 
that it pleads facts which would meet this standard, and, as a 
result, the District Court erred in remanding this case back to 
state court.   
 
Because I would hold that the Complaint here pleads a 
class action for purposes of CAFA jurisdiction, I respectfully 
dissent.  
                                                                                                                                  
A, the Complaint here seeks relief for individual subscribers, 
and Pennsylvania law allows subscribers, in their individual 
capacity, to bring a class action.  See, e.g., Nye v. Erie Ins. 
Exchange, 470 A.2d 98, 99-100 (Pa. 1983) (finding that 
subscribers of Exchange had standing to bring a class action). 
